
















Monetary policy has an important role in the determination of the inflation rate and 
the output gap time trajectories. Monetary authorities should choose the nominal interest 
rate time path that best serves the goals of price stability (primarily) and output growth (as a 
consequence of the first). In this paper it is presented a framework under which an optimal 
interest rate rule is computed, and this rule is found to be stabilizing. The stability result is 
true for a homogeneous expectations scenario, where all individuals believe that inflation 
converges to a long run low level. Introducing expectations heterogeneity under a bounded 
rationality – discrete choice setup, this result continues to hold, but now we cannot exclude 
periods of strong price instability that, nevertheless, do not tend to persist for long periods 
of time.  
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Central banks, like the European Central Bank or the American Federal Reserve, 
are  the  guardians  of  price  stability.  Monetary  policy  has,  as  primary  objective,  the 
control  of  inflationary  pressures.  Alongside  with  this  central  goal,  monetary  policy 
makers can also aim to stimulate growth or fine-tune the economy, but this goal should 
not jeopardize price stability, the ultimate and central policy target. As Svensson and 
Woodford (2003) clearly put it, “In recent  years,  many  central  banks have adopted 
‘inflation targeting’ frameworks for the conduct of monetary policy. These have proven 
in a  number  of countries to be effective  means  of first  lowering  inflation  and then 
maintaining both low and stable inflation and inflation expectations, without negative 
consequences for the output gap. Thus, the new approach to monetary policy has been 
judged quite successful, as far as its consequences for the average level of inflation and 
the output gap are concerned.” (page 1). 
To control inflation, central banks have a high degree of independence relatively 
to  political  power.  Independent  monetary  policy  implies  that  the  central  banks  can 
choose  their  targets  (as  referred,  mainly  inflation  but  possibly  also  output  and 
employment)  and also the instrument  to attain the wanted goals. The instrument  of 
monetary policy is commonly the short-run market interest rate that is set for money 
transactions between banks. 
Setting nominal interest rates to influence the inflation rate is a complex activity. 
It  is  necessary  some  degree  of  discretion  to  respond  to  changes  in  the  economic 
environment, but without a somehow fixed rule it is not possible for the policy makers 
to gain credibility and therefore to build a reputation that helps to maintain inflation 
expectations low. The rules versus discretion debate is a crucial debate in monetary Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  3 
 
policy, that has gained special relevance with the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
and Barro and Gordon (1983). These authors have emphasized that monetary policy 
effectiveness is directly dependent on central bank’s credibility.  
The question of credibility arises because we have a two way system: on one hand 
it is true that the central bank responds to private sector changes in expected inflation 
through the use of its monetary policy instrument but, on the other hand, the private 
sector behavior is also dependent on how the course of monetary policy is perceived by 
the economic agents and on expectations that are formed about future monetary policy. 
Having this idea in mind, the technical literature emphasizes that expectations of low 
inflation  should  not  be  used  by  central  banks  to  adopt  and  pursue  output  oriented 
expansionary policies. If central banks act in this way, the public will not in fact expect 
low inflation what implies a final result of high inflation without significant output 
gains.  
This is indeed a game between the central bank and the private economy that does 
not lead to an optimal outcome; if the policy maker announces that inflation will equal 
some low value and the private economy sets its expectations accordingly, the policy 
maker can deviate from the policy once expectations are formed in order to gain in 
terms of output, that is, reneging on the commitment raises social welfare. The problem 
is that private sector expectations will not be maintained and as a result monetary policy 
decisions give place to inefficiently high inflation. Therefore, under discretion there is 
an  inflationary  bias  and  we  can  classify  monetary  policy  as  being  dynamically 
inconsistent.  Total  discretionarity  should  be,  in  this  way,  avoided  by  monetary 
authorities. 
Because a commitment makes monetary policy credible, rules tend to give better 
results  in  controlling  inflation  growth.  Nevertheless,  the  commitment  should  not  be Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  4 
 
totally  binding.  It  has  to  be  somehow  flexible  to  face  eventual  unexpected 
circumstances and to account for errors that might arise when the central bank makes 
the  evaluation  of  economic  conditions  and  forms  its  own  expectations  about  the 
economy’s expectations.
2 Furthermore, the commitment may not come in the form of a 
specific value or time path for the nominal interest rate; for instance, Rogoff (1985) 
talks about delegation: if the central bank is known to be especially averse to inflation 
and it is common knowledge that it acts in an independent way, this can be sufficient to 
solve  the  dynamic  inconsistency  problem  because,  as  referred,  the  main  issue  is 
credibility. If this credibility comes from reputation or from a more or less binding rule 
this is not the most relevant. 
Rules that set interest rate time paths in some initial moment are essentially of two 
types: 
(1) optimal rules, that are obtained by solving an intertemporal optimization model 
where the central bank takes a policy problem constrained by some given conditions 
about the functioning of the economic system, and,  
(2) Taylor rules or non-optimal interest rate rules, which link the interest rate to 
expected inflation and expected output gap. Taylor rules are non optimal in the sense 
that the interest rate time path is not derived from an optimal control setup, but as it is 
known from the literature, they may have practical advantages, namely in the sense that 
steady state stability can be assured, what is not always true for optimal rules. 
The issue of stability is a central one. The framework to adopt in this paper will 
consider an optimal interest rate rule that, for a set of parameters with reasonable values, 
is  stabilizing  and  thus  Taylor  rules  will  not  be  in  the  centre  of  our  concern. 
Nevertheless, Taylor rules stability is a widely discussed matter;
3 a commonly accepted 
remark about monetary policy is that a particular class of Taylor rules is stabilizing, but Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  5 
 
not all Taylor rules. Taylor rules may be of two kinds: (1) passive interest rate rules (for 
a one point increase in expected inflation, the interest rate is risen by less than one 
point); (2) active interest rate rules (for a one point increase in expected inflation, the 
central bank rises the interest rate by more than one point). Following Taylor (1993), 
active interest rate rules are stabilizing while passive ones are not. In a simple rational 
expectations  framework  this  has  been  taken  along  the  last  decade  as  an  acceptable 
result, but, for some authors, a more sophisticated setup implies the necessity to review 
it. Bernanke and Woodford (1997) show that  indeterminacy  and multiple stationary 
rational expectations equilibria might arise; Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and 
Honkapohja (2003) state that the indeterminacy result may exist when expectations are 
not fully rational but result from a learning process; Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2001a, 2001b, 2001c) argue that active interest rate rules are only locally stable, that is, 
if the initial state of the economy is not in the vicinity of the steady state, then the 
system will converge to a liquidity trap, that is, to a state in which the nominal interest 
rate is near zero and inflation is eventually negative. Depending on the specification of 
the model, active monetary policy may result also in multiple equilibria or even chaotic 
dynamics. The important result according to these authors is that a local analysis (in the 
vicinity of the steady state) might wrongly lead to the conclusion that active monetary 
policy is stabilizing when it is not – in fact, under the mentioned reasoning, models that 
accurately describe monetary policy concerns generally lead to global indeterminacy. 
The adoption of different types of rules is a subject that has been widely studied in 
the  past  few  years,  in  theoretical  grounds  [see,  e.g.,  Christiano  and  Gust  (1999), 
Giannoni  and  Woodford  (2002),  Kerr  and  King  (1996),  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
(1999), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Svensson  (1999, 2002)]  and also from an 
empirical point of view [Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), Judd and Rudebusch (1998) Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  6 
 
and  King  (1997),  among  others].  Although  these  studies  encounter  different  results 
concerning the notion of an optimal  monetary  policy and of  a stabilizing  monetary 
policy, they have important points in common: they all understand that monetary policy 
should be forward-looking, in particular based in expectations about future inflation; it 
is also generally accepted that monetary policy should be guided by the understanding 
that there is a short-run trade-off between price stability and real economic activity (a 
kind of Phillips curve relation); furthermore, the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy is commonly accepted to be linked with the influence of the real interest rate over 
investment and output. It is under a framework that takes these features into account 
that we will study in the following sections optimal monetary policy. 
 
As  mentioned,  in  this  kind  of  analysis  of  the  impact  of  monetary  policy,  the 
formation of expectations is a fundamental issue. One important point, discussed in 
Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) has to do with the matching of private and central bank 
expectations. The argument is that if the private institutions acquire knowledge about 
how  the  central  bank  sets  its  decisions  according  to  forecasts  of  such  private 
institutions, then these institutions might change their forecasts strategically in order to 
influence monetary policy decisions. In this scenario, the central bank would have to 
consider  internal  forecasts  that  could  deviate  from  private  economy  expectations. 
Conventional monetary policy models avoid this kind of consideration by assuming that 
the private economy does not have these strategic capabilities. 
Another  crucial  point  about  expectations  relates  to  how  they  are  formed.  The 
trivial  analysis,  that  looks  at  the  formation  of  optimal  rules  and  to  the  stability  of 
optimal and non-optimal rules, considers rational expectations. Recent macroeconomic 
literature points to other ways of forming expectations. An important strand of literature Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  7 
 
at this level  is the learning  approach  developed by  Sargent  (1993, 1999), Marimon 
(1997)  and  Evans  and  Honkapohja  (1999,  2001).  Under  the  learning  approach,  the 
expectations  of  the  agents  are  adjusted  over  time  as  new  data  becomes  available. 
Parameter updating is made through standard econometric estimation procedures. Other 
expectation  formation  rules  include  genetic  algorithms  /  computational  intelligence 
[Arifovic (1994, 1998)], eductive learning, that is, learning through a mental process of 
reasoning [Guesnerie (1992, 2002)], and discrete choice models [Brock and Hommes 
(1997, 1998)]. Discrete choice has been used predominantly in financial markets to 
explain how heterogeneity of expectations might lead to asset prices time paths that are 
erratic, impossible to predict and that can deviate for long periods of time from the 
fundamental solution.  
 
The analysis to undertake in the following sections is concerned with the themes 
discussed previously in this introduction, namely monetary policy, interest rate rules 
and expectations. The following remarks will guide our discussion: 
First – it is important to assess optimality and stability of monetary rules; 
Second – not all individuals form expectations about future events in the same 
way. Given this evidence, the rational expectations framework is replaced by a discrete 
choice  setup,  where  individuals  choose  to  form  expectations  according  to  different 
rules.
4  There  are  heterogeneous  expectations  and  these  are  guided  by  a  bounded 
rationality mechanism that is given by discrete choice theory. 
In this way, our main goal is to use the expectation formation setup proposed by 
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Gaunersdorfer, Hommes and Wagener (2003) and 
Diks and Van der Weide (2003), among others, which has leaded to the influential 
‘rational routes to randomness’ literature on financial asset pricing, and apply it to the Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  8 
 
formation of expectations about inflation. With inflation expectations formed in this 
way, we intend to study optimal interest rate rules stability and find out if there are 
important differences relatively to the rational expectations benchmark.   
 
The manuscript is organized as follows. The second section formalizes a monetary 
policy model. The model is the two equation system proposed by Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler  (1999)  and  Woodford  (1999,  2003),  which  should  be  viewed  as  a 
characterization of the short-run conditions governing the functioning of the economic 
system.  The  system  contains  an  IS  curve  (an  equation  that  relates  the  output  gap 
inversely to the real interest rate) and a Phillips curve (an equation that relates inflation 
positively with  the  output  gap). The two referred equations are the constraints of a 
policy design problem, which consists on the setting of the interest rate time path that 
best serves the policy goal, that is mainly price stability. In the third section, optimality 
and stability of monetary policy are addressed; in this section we restrict the analysis to 
homogeneous  expectations,  and  expectations  are  formed  in  a  fundamentalist  way: 
economic agents believe that inflation and output will converge to some known long run 
value.  The  fourth  section  introduces  heterogeneous  expectations  and  explains  the 
discrete  choice  /  adaptive  learning  monetary  policy  problem,  while  section  five 
characterizes the conditions for monetary policy stability under our setup. The most 
interesting point in this characterization is that stability is found, but this is a new kind 
of  stability:  interest  rate  and  inflation  paths  are  not  constant  or  fully  predictable, 
although  there  is a  reversion  to  the  mean mechanism  that  avoids  the  values  of  the 
variables to depart permanently or for long periods of time from a steady state trend. 
Finally, section six discusses the most relevant conclusions. 
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II. THE BASELINE MODEL 
 
We begin by setting up a framework to the analysis of monetary policy. This 
framework is adapted directly from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), but has its roots on 
the staggered nominal price setting setup with monopolistically competitive firms due to 
Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980), Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). 
The reduced form of the model is a two equation system composed by an IS curve 
and a Phillips curve. The equations are, respectively, 
[ ] t t t t t t t g x E E i x + + - - = + + 1 1 . p j   (1) 
t t t t t u E x + + = +1 . . p b l p   (2) 
The endogenous variables of the system (1)-(2) are the output gap (xt) and period t 
inflation rate (pt). The output gap is defined by xt=yt-zt, where yt is the deviation of 
output from a deterministic long run trend (in logs) and zt is the natural level of output 
(also in logs). Note that zt is the level of output that would arise if wages and prices 
were perfectly flexible; it represents potential output. Variable it is the nominal interest 
rate, the instrument of monetary policy and consequently the control variable of the 
policy problem. 
The parameters (all positive values) are,  
j:  interest  elasticity.  This  parameter  reflects  intertemporal  substitution  of 
consumption, since it establishes a negative effect of the real interest rate on current 
output. 
l: output-inflation elasticity. This establishes a relation between output and prices 
growth; hence, the higher the value of the parameter the more sensitive are prices due to 
output changes. A low l indicates price rigidity. Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  10 
 
b:  discount  factor.  This  represents  the  degree  of  sensitivity  relating  expected 
inflation with current inflation. Note that ½<b<1, and the higher isb the lower is the 
discount rate. 
Expected values assume  a central place  in the equations: Etpt+1 and Etxt+1 are 
expected inflation rate and expected output gap respectively (these values are expected 
in period t for period t+1). These are private sector expectations that the central bank 
considers to base its monetary policy decisions. In the next section, where optimality 
and stability of monetary policy are discussed, a rule for the formation of expectations 
has to be considered. We will assume that economic agents predict that inflation and 
output gap will converge for some long run values p* and x*. The rates of convergence 
will  be  v,  w  Î  (0,1)  and  expectations  will  be  based  on  period  t-1  observations. 
Therefore, 
*) .( * 1 1 x x w x x E t t t - + = - +   (3) 
*) .( * 1 1 p p p p - + = - + t t t v E   (4) 
Finally,  gt  and  ut  are  disturbance  terms.  We  define  these  variables  as  AR(1) 
processes,  
t t t g g g ˆ . 1 + = - m   (5) 
t t t u u u ˆ . 1 + = - r   (6) 
where 0 £ m, r £ 1. According to Honkapohja and Mitra (2003), gt represents shocks to 
government purchases and / or potential output; ut represents any cost push shocks to 
marginal  costs  other  than  those  entering  through  xt.  Variables  t g ˆ   and  t u ˆ   are  i.i.d. 
random variables with zero mean and variances 
2
g s  and 
2
u s , respectively. 
The  two  equations,  (1) and  (2), are constraints  for  the  central  bank  in  setting 
monetary policy. The central bank maximizes a policy function subject to constraints Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  11 
 
(1) and (2). The objective function is a welfare measure that guides policy choices; two 
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Parameter a reflects the relative weight on output deviations. Because the main 
goal of the central bank is to promote price stability, a is certainly less than one, and it 
is probably near zero in practice for monetary authorities in developed economies. 
The policy problem is, then, the following: the central bank chooses a time path 
for the instrument or control variable it to engineer time paths of the target variables xt 
and pt that maximize the objective function (7) given the two constraints on behavior 
(1) and (2). 
A  first  step  in  the  quest  for  an  optimal  interest  rate  time  path  should  be  the 
replacement  in  (1)  and  (2)  of  expectations  variables  for  the  rules  under  which 
expectations are formed [(3) and (4)]. Some computation transforms (1) and (2) in (8) 
and (9), 
t t t t t g x w v x w v i x + - + - + - - + - = D - - * ). 1 ( * . ). 1 ( ). 1 ( . . . 1 1 p j p j j   (8) 
[ ]
t t
t t t t
u g x w v
x w v i
+ + - + + -
+ + + - - - = D - -
. * . ). 1 ( * ). . ).( 1 (             
. . . ) . .( 1 . . 1 1
l l p l j b
l p l j b l j p
 
(9) 
where  1 - - º D t t t x x x   and  1 - - º D t t t p p p . 
In the following section the policy problem will be solved. We will distinguish 
between discretion and commitment and find, for both cases optimality conditions and 
optimal interest rate paths. Giving then attention solely to the commitment case we will 
address the stability concern. One finds that for reasonable parameter values the optimal 
interest  rate  rule  is  stabilizing:  there  is  a  convergence  to  the  steady  state  locus Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  12 
 
independently  of  the  initial  point.  Note  once  again  that  these  results  are  true  for 
expectations given by (3) and (4). 
 
III. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY. THE STABILITY CONCERN 
 
As stated in the introduction, the problem in the previous section may be solved 
under discretion or under commitment. Discretion means that the problem is solved in 
each time moment by the central bank, and so we have a sequence of static optimization 
problems instead of a dynamic intertemporal problem. In the case of discretion, Etpt+1 
and Etxt+1 are taken as given by the central bank, and thus (3) and (4) are ignored. 
Setting up a Lagrangean function and finding an optimality condition, we have, 
t t x p
a
l
. - =   (10) 
Equation (10) is an equation presented in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) that 
simply says that under optimal conditions there is a trade-off between inflation and the 
output gap. Relation (10) will hold for a specific interest rate that is optimal for the 
given maximization problem. This interest rate can be revealed by replacing (10) and 
(2) in (1),  
























+ = + +   (11) 
Interest rate (11) is the optimal interest rate under discretion. It is the interest rate 
that maximizes the value of the objective function. Note that, as it is intuitively true, 
high expected inflation and output gap imply the choice of a higher interest rate.
5 
If the central bank is concerned only in controlling inflation, a=0, the interest rate 
optimal value will simplify to  Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  13 
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Under  discretion  the  stability  issue  is  not  a  concern,  because  the  monetary 
authority can change the interest rate in each time moment and thus avoid that the 
inflation rate and the output gap depart substantially from long run values; the problem 
with  this  kind  of  procedure  is  the  one  identified  in  the  introduction:  the  dynamic 
inconsistency problem. 
 
Let us turn now to commitment. Under commitment we have an intertemporal 
problem: the central bank chooses today the optimal interest rate for all future time 
moments. What is lost in terms of discretionarity is gained in terms of reputation and 
thus  expectations  predictability.  The  issue  of  stability  now  arises  in  the  sense  that 
convergence  to  the  steady  state  may  not  be  guaranteed  in  the  initial  moment.  The 
optimal control problem is, we recall, the maximization of (7) subject to (8) and (9), 
with x0, p0 given. 
To  solve  the  optimal  control  problem  we  set  up  a  Hamiltonian  function  (a 
dynamic Lagrangean function) and determine the optimality conditions. The procedure 
is presented in detail in an appendix in the end of the text. From the optimal solution of 
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  (13) 
with  0 ) . 1 .( ) .(
2 2 > - + + - º b a l a l b h v . Equation (13) is the interest rate the central 
bank chooses in an initial moment for the future. This interest rate is chosen according 
to last period observed inflation rate and output gap, to long run expected inflation rate Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  14 
 
and output gap and to the disturbance terms. It is relevant to notice that the higher last 
period output gap and the higher the long run fundamental expected values, the larger 
will be the value of the nominal interest rate set by monetary authorities. The same is 
presumably true for last period inflation rate but this is not an unambiguous result – for 
some combination of parameter values a higher inflation rate in t-1 may lead to a lower 
interest rate; looking at (13) we conclude that it varies positively with pt-1 if the velocity 
of convergence of inflation to the correspondent long run value is not too fast (high v), 
that is, the following condition must be satisfied, 
) .( . l b b h j
b
+ +
> v   (14) 
Given the optimal interest rate rule, (13), we are interested in knowing if this rule 
is stable, that is, if the time paths of the inflation rate and of the output gap tend for their 
long run steady values, independently from where the initial point (x0,p0) is located. We 
will show that, under reasonable values for parameters, stability is observed and, thus, 
in our framework, where expectations imply the belief in a convergence process to the 
steady state, optimal monetary policy is synonymous of the best possible achievable 
outcome. 
To study the stability of optimal policy, we have to replace interest rate (13) in the 
system of equations (8) and (9). Once again, the derivation is made in the appendix in 
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  (15) 
Stability is analyzed through the first squared matrix of system (15). Let this be 
matrix  J.  Stability  requires  that  the  eigenvalues  of  J  must  be,  both,  located  in  the 
interval (-2,0). To compute these eigenvaules we take reasonable values for the several 
parameters. We rely on Benigno and López-Salido (2002) and recall the constraints 
upon parameters to choose the set {v, j, b, l, a}={0.75, 0.5, 0.98, 0.75, 0.1}.
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  (16) 
Solving  for  the  steady  state,  we  find  that  long  run  values  depend  on  the 
disturbance term: (x*,p*)=(-1.0575.ut; 0.0499.ut). Relatively to the eigenvalues, these 
are e1=-1.1014 and e2=-0.4215. Hence, stability is guaranteed for the chosen set of 
parameter values – independently of the initial levels of inflation and output deviation 
from its trend, the imposition of an interest rate path for all future moments that results 
from an optimal choice leads to the accomplishment of a long run steady state with low 
inflation and a low deviation of output from trend values.  
To illustrate the stability result of the optimal rule we draw the time path of the 
inflation rate and the time path of the output gap. To proceed with this representation 
we have to specify the evolution of ut. Let r=0.9 and su=0.001. Figures 1 and 2 respect 
to the steady state paths of inflation rate and output gap. As shown, there is no tendency Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  16 
 
for  these  paths  to  deviate  from  a  constant  mean  and  the  only  fluctuations  that  are 

























Figure 2 – Output gap time path under an optimal monetary policy rule 
 
IV. HETEROGENEOUS INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 
The previous section looked at monetary policy under a setup where the central 
bank knows that individuals know that the inflation rate and the output gap tend to 
constant (plus a disturbance) steady state values. In this section, we continue to consider Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  17 
 
the  optimal  interest  rate  rule  (13),  that  is,  we  consider  that  the  monetary  authority 
believes that private expectations are formed under the convergence assumption, but 
now in reality only a fraction of the economic agents will form their expectations in this 
way. The alternative expectations formation setting is one in which individuals are trend 
followers  –  they  will  predict  inflation  according  to  past  variations  in  this  rate. 
Individuals  can  alternate  between  expectation  formation  rules  according  to  the 
performance of such rules. In this section we present in detail this setup, and section V 
will  illustrate  numerically  how  the  new  assumption  about  expectations  can  lead  to 
significant changes in steady state results. 
The  monetary  authority  uses  the  model  in  the  previous  section  to  choose  the 
interest rate rule. This is (13), which under our numerical example corresponds to (now 
we consider also a value for the other convergence parameter: w=0.75),  
t t t t t u g x x i . 8188 . 2 . 2 * . 3069 . 0 * . 9406 . 0 . 6597 . 1 . 225 . 1 1 1 + + + + + = - - p p   (17) 
The difference relatively to last section’s setup is that we no longer consider that 
expectations about inflation are homogeneous.
7 Part of the individuals on the economy 
believe that next period inflation will be given by a rule like (4), but other agents will be 
trend followers, that is, they will adjust their expectations according to a rule where 
previous inflation changes are taken into account.  The  rules that  the  two groups of 
individuals assume concerning inflation expectations are 
*) .( * 1 1 1 p p p p - + = - + t t t v E   (18) 
) .( 2 1 1 1 2 - - - + - + = t t t t t m E p p p p   (19) 
Equation (18) is equal to (4), but now only for a group of agents of type h=1, 
while (19) is a trend following expectation rule that individuals of type h=2 believe to 
best represent the true inflation path over time. Parameter m>0 translates the importance 
of past inflation changes in the formation of inflation expectations. Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  18 
 
If  the  private  sector  economic  agents  were  fully  rational  they  would  choose 
between (18) and (19) in order to get the best possible result in terms of accomplished 
or  expected  benefits  (measured  in  terms  of  output  and  price  stability).  The  main 
assumption in this heterogeneous expectations setup is that individuals are not fully 
rational. They obey to a bounded rationality process, in which they change behavior in 
face of changes in their outcome, but where this process is not immediate and definitive. 
The bounded rationality assumption is linked with discrete choice theory, as developed 
in Manski and McFadden (1981) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1993), which 
involves the following mechanism. 
Assume that n1t is the share of individuals that follow the expectations formation 
rule (18) and that, consequently, 1- n1t is the share of individuals that in a given time 
moment t choose the other rule, (19). They will change their behavior according to (20).   
t t
t












=   (20) 
Parameter b is the intensity of choice. This positive parameter reflects the degree of 
rationality in the choice. If b is close to zero, individuals prefer to stay with their present 
choice even if this performs worse than the other; a high b represents a high degree of 
rationality,  where  the  obtained  results  determine  in a  more  straightforward  way  the 
choice of the best strategy. 
Variable Uht, h=1,2, is a fitness function or performance measure. It represents the 
way  in  which  previous  expectations  have  performed  in  terms  of  the  individuals 




















. Function f measures the deviation of the expected inflation 
rate relatively to the observed inflation rate in the last period; this value is measured as a 
rate and it is presented in such a way to give always a negative value (thus, the closer to Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  19 
 
zero is f the better is the forecast made by the given type of agents concerning future 
inflation.  
Having described the way in which the private sector sets up its expectations and 
how individuals may change the expectations formation rule, we can now integrate this 
setup into the two equation monetary model [(1) and (2)]. In this system, the nominal 
interest rate is the optimal one and expectations about future inflation are given by a 
weighted average of different expectations, i.e., 
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 ). 1 ( . + + + - + = t t t t t t t t E n E n E p p p   (21) 
To further develop the model we recover the numerical example. Meanwhile some 
new  parameters  have  been  presented.  The  following  values  are  adopted:  {m,  b,  c,  
z}={0.95, 1, 0.01, 0.9}. In section V we discuss the results of the following set of 
equations: 
·  it: given by (17); 
·  [ ] t t t t t t g x x E i x + - - - - = D - + *) .( 25 . 0 . 5 . 0 1 1 p ; 
·  t t t t t t t u g x x E i + + + + + - = - + . 75 . 0 * . 1875 . 0 . 5625 . 0 . 355 . 1 . 375 . 0 1 1 p p ; 
·  Etpt+1: given by (21); 
·  E1tpt+1 and E2tpt+1: given by (18) and (19); 
·  nht, Uht, fht: as defined in this section. 
As before, we assume r=0.9 and su=0.001; also, now we consider m=0.9 and 
sg=0.001.  
Anticipating the results to evidence in the next section, the introduction of a new 
expectations formation rule for inflation and the consideration of a boundedly rational 
scenario will lead to a long run path for inflation that is not unstable (the inflation rate 
does not tend to infinity, neither a multiple equilibria result is present) but that also is Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  20 
 
not stable in the sense of section III. There, the inflation rate could be found around a 
steady state value according to the Markov process underlying the term ut. In this new 
framework, we will find an erratic pattern, where periods of high inflation and periods 
of low inflation alternate and where it is impossible to predict future inflation having as 
reference  some  initial  point.  The  main  result  is,  then,  that  in  an  economy  with 
heterogeneous expectations about inflation, the adoption of an optimal fundamentalist 
monetary policy rule leads to an inflation time path that is impossible to predict, where 
volatility clustering may exist and where periods of high and low inflation might have 
all types of lengths. The good news are that optimal policy is not non stabilizing in the 
sense of stimulating explosive inflation paths.  
  
V. STABILITY UNDER HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS 
 
Under  the  values  assumed  for  parameters  in  the  last  section  and  taking 
x0=p0=0.001, we encounter an inflation time path that can assume multiple forms; an 
















Figure 3 – Inflation rate time path under a heterogeneous expectations setup. Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  21 
 
 
The time path of inflation, under the heterogeneous expectations assumption, is 
very  sensitive  to  changes  in  parameter  values  and  in  initial  values  of  variables. 
However, the pattern will be always something like in figure 3. There will be relatively 
long periods where inflation gravitates along a steady state value (in this case, like in 
figure  1,  this  value  is  zero),  but  the  heterogeneity  assumption  introduces  a  second 
feature: in some moments of time, which initially are impossible to predict, periods of 
high or low inflation (or both) might arise; stability then returns and is maintained for 
some time interval. 
We conclude that if the central bank acts as if individuals were rational (thinking 
that inflation tends to a long run constant value), and thus chooses a nominal interest 
rate  accordingly,  then  the  existence  of  a  group  of  economic  agents  that  are  trend 
followers or chartists implies that stability continues to hold but short periods of intense 
price instability are unavoidable. 
To  understand  how  sensitive  the  time  path  of  prices  growth  in  figure  3  is  to 
changes in parameters and variables initial values, take the following examples: 
a) Alternatively to p0=0.001, consider p0=0.002 (the other values in our numerical 
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Figure 4 – Inflation rate time path under a heterogeneous expectations setup, with a change in the 
initial value of inflation. 
 
From figure 4 we regard a same kind of pattern as for the initial example, but the 
time moments where important fluctuations occur have visibly changed. 
b) Other change that can be made relates to  the  trend followers parameter  m. 
Assume  a  slight  positive  change  in  the  value  of  this  parameter:  m=1.05.  Figure  5 













Figure 5 – Inflation rate time path under a heterogeneous expectations setup, with a change in the 
value of parameter m. 
 
Once again, the notorious fact is that significant changes from the steady state 
result occur at unpredictable points in time. 
c) Finally, suppose a change in the value of the intensity of choice parameter. We 
have stated that this parameter is a measure of the degree of rationality underlying the 
change  from  a  poor  performance  expectation  rule  to  the  better  performance  one. 
Assuming  b=1.025,  the  degree  of  rationality  will  rise  relatively  to  the  considered Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  23 
 
benchmark case, so individuals will change their expectation rule about future inflation 
with a higher frequency. The result is a new inflation rate trajectory, presented in figure 















Figure 6 – Inflation rate time path under a heterogeneous expectations setup, with a change in the 
intensity of choice. 
 
The most notorious change in figure 6 relatively to figure 3 is that the departures 
of the inflation rate from the steady state result are now more intense, reaching, in one 
case, 20%. 
 
The  three  previous  modifications  relatively  to  our  initial  example  imply  two 
relevant conclusions: 
- the introduction of expectations heterogeneity means that short periods of strong 
price instability can happen, even under an optimal monetary policy; 
- strong price movements can occur at any time moment and thus are impossible 
to predict (not only the time they happen but also the length they have); nevertheless, 
optimal  monetary  policy  guarantees,  under  the  model’s  assumptions,  a  predictable Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  24 
 
pattern of stability that alternates with the unpredictable time limited deviations from 




In the last few years, monetary policy has been studied under a framework that 
characterizes short run economic conditions. This setup is composed by an IS curve and 
by a Phillips curve. This system considers as endogenous variables the inflation rate and 
a measure of the difference between effective and potential output. These two variables 
are state variables, that is, they depend on private sector economic conditions and they 
cannot be determinated by any public authority.  
Nevertheless, monetary authorities can influence the results concerning the time 
trajectories of such two variables through the manipulation of the variable that is usually 
used as the monetary policy instrument: the nominal interest rate. Though, there is an 
important problem, that relates to the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy, which 
implies that central banks should commit primarily with price stability. 
In  this  way,  we  can  consider  an  optimal  control  problem  for  the  monetary 
authority, which consists in maximizing an objective function, where a low inflation 
rate is the central concern but where output considerations may also be present. This 
problem leads to an optimal interest rate rule, that is, to a time path for the interest rate 
in the future that is the one that best contributes to attain the policy goal. 
Under our framework, and given a set of reasonable parameter values, the optimal 
interest rate rule is stabilizing, meaning that for any initial values of the inflation rate 
and of the output gap a steady state result is always obtained. This steady state result is Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  25 
 
not a pair of constant values, but close; oscillations in the long run values of these 
variables are simply the result of a disturbance term that follows a Markov process. 
The  stability  result  is  also  conditional  on  the  way  expectations  about  future 
inflation  and  output  gap  are  formed.  Our  assumption  was  that  individuals  are 
fundamentalists, that is, they believe that both variables will evolve to a steady state 
value given some velocity of convergence parameters. 
The question we have asked then was does the optimal interest rate rule continues 
to be stabilizing if not all the agents in the economy have fundamentalist expectations? 
The answer is yes, but there are important mutations that have to be highlighted.  
The heterogeneous expectations setup has considered the same policy problem as 
in the homogeneous case and it was assumed that the central bank made its policy 
choice considering that economic agents are all fundamentalists, thus the considered 
interest rate rule was the same as before. But in this second stage we have separated 
agents  between  fundamentalists  and  chartists;  this  second  group  forms  expectations 
about inflation giving attention to the past history of inflation changes and ignoring the 
convergence  to  the  steady  state mechanism.  Individuals  could  change the  way  they 
formed their  expectations, but such happened  in a bounded  rationality way, that is, 
changes to the best performance expectation rule are here not immediate and definitive. 
Putting together all the ingredients of the heterogeneous expectations scenario we 
have  found,  using  the  same  numerical  example  as  in  the  homogeneous  case,  that 
stability continuous to hold, but a new feature is present; in some unexpected moments 
of time price stability disappears and large fluctuations in the inflation rate are observed. 
Nevertheless, these deviations from the steady state result do not tend to persist and the 
stability result is rapidly recovered. 
 Optimal Monetary Policy under Heterogeneous Expectations  26 
 
APPENDIX – FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS, THE DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIMAL INTEREST 
RATE AND THE IS – PHILLIPS CURVE OPTIMAL SYSTEM 
 
To the policy problem in sections II and III corresponds, in a t-1 moment, the 
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with qt-1(x) and qt-1(p) shadow-prices of xt-1 and pt-1 respectively. 
The first order conditions are: 
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Conditions (A2) and (A3) are transversality conditions.  
To  find  the  optimal  nominal  interest  rate,  we  begin  by  differentiating  the 
optimality condition (A4), obtaining 
) ( . ) ( 1 1 p l - - D - = D t t q x q   (A7) 
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Using (A8) to eliminate the shadow-price from expression (A9), 
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p a   (A10) 
Considering relation (A10) in period t and replacing in this Dxt and Dpt by the 
correspondent IS and Phillips curve expressions, (8) and (9), we find, after a somehow 
heavy computation the interest rate rule presented in expression (13). 
To find the IS – Phillips curve system under conditions of optimality we just have 
to replace (13) in (8) and (9), getting, after some calculus, 
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2 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) emphasize in this respect that “In practice, no major central bank makes 
any kind of binding commitment over the course of its future monetary policy.” (page 1671).  
3    This  happens  because  implementing  optimal  policy  is  not  easy;  it  is  not  clear  which  is  the  true 
economic model and the perception that the central bank has about how expectations are formed is not 
perfect. Does, in practice, central banks compromise with well definable rules rather than with an abstract 
concept of optimality that is hard to implement.  
4  Basically, following Brock and Hommes (1998), we will consider that economic agents follow one of 
two expectation formation rules: (1) a fundamentalist rule, under which individuals expect economic 
variables to converge through time to a long run fundamental value, and (2) a trend rule, which implies 
that individuals form expectations according to the recent history regarding economic variables evolution. 
5  If it is expected a positive output gap (GDP above its trend value), then the central bank should raise 
interest rates; if inflation expectations are above their target, then interest rates also should increase. 
6  Note that we do not consider for now a value for the convergence velocity parameter w because the 
optimal interest rate rule makes this parameter to disappear from the IS – Phillips curve system. 
7  For simplicity, we continue to assume that expectations about next period output gap are homogeneous 
and given by (3). 